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How Prosecution Can Lead to Prevention
Luis Moreno-Ocampot
Introduction
I am very glad to be here, because I have worked with the
Center for Victims of Torture' for twenty-two years. Currently,
the Center works in many areas where the International Criminal
Court (ICC) is working, and in fact they have programs with the
Court. Indeed, the mandate of the Court requires me, in addition
to the Court's legal work, to support victims of the crimes that we
investigate. Kathryn Sikkink2 was a young scholar in 1985 when
she attended the Argentine junta trials, and I am glad she kept
working on these issues. Now she is here, presenting a different
perception of what is happening. The world is changing. In the
last twenty-five years that we've worked on these issues, the world
has changed dramatically. Ruti Teitel' is also here, and she in fact
invited me to Boston a few months ago to attend a meeting on
genocide, so I'm very glad to be here with some old friends.
I. The Rome Statute and the Role of the International
Criminal Court
A. Adoption and Ratification of the Treaty

I have the privilege and the responsibility to be the first prosecutor of this new idea, a court, created by the Rome Statute.'

t. Luis Moreno-Ocampo was appointed Prosecutor for the International
Criminal Court in 2003. This text is the edited transcript of Prosecutor MorenoOcampo's opening address at the Law and Inequality Symposium, "International
Wrongs, International Rights: The Use of Criminal Law to Protect Human Rights,"
September 28, 2010, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Who We Are, THE CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE, http://www.cvt.orgl

page/62 (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
2. Kathryn Sikkink is Regents Professor and McKnight Presidential Chair in
Political Science at the University of Minnesota. Professor Sikkink was a panelist
at the Law and Inequality Symposium, discussing the deterrent effect of human
rights prosecutions.
3. Ruti Teitel is the Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law at New
York Law School. Professor Teitel was a panelist at the Law and Inequality
Symposium, discussing transitional justice as a global phenomenon.
4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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And today I am working. My plan is to present to you what we are
doing and receive your ideas, in order to learn from you. Let me
first explain what we have been doing.
The idea is the following: this treaty, approved in 1998" in
Rome, where 139 states signed, committed to end impunity for the
most serious crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity,

and war crimes, and thus contributed to the prevention of such
crimes.6 A great number of countries have signed the treaty.' The
United States signed and then unsigned,' and we respect the unsigned. The countries that signed the treaty include almost all the
Americas, all of Africa except for some Arab countries, all of Europe including Russia, plus Australia and New Zealand.! These are
the countries that will decide the direction of the Rome Treaty.
This idea was quite heady, because it is a new step for the Westphalia movement.o Under this treaty, these countries signed and
committed themselves to prevent and punish genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes." But the second and most innovative idea was they accepted that if they don't honor these commitments, an international criminal court, permanent and inde-

pendent, can take the case, and in this sense, they created a coalition with the court to ensure that no one will fail to punish these
crimes. 2 And these states, the members of the treaty, are committed to support the International Criminal Court, whenever and
wherever the Court decides to act. This is not a revolution because
it's an agreement

among sovereign

states, but it

is a huge

evolution, because it creates a global confederation to fight for a
specific goal.

5. Id.
6. Ratification of the Rome Statute, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeratification (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
7. See World Signatures and Ratifications, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL
COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romesignatures (last visited Jan. 28, 2011)
(indicating that the Rome Statute currently has 139 signatories and 111
ratifications).
8. David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 990-91
(2008).
9. See The States Partiesto the Rome Statute, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL
COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Jan. 28,
2011).
10. See Edward M. Wise, The International Criminal Court: A Budget of
Paradoxes,8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 261, 264 (2000) (describing the "Westphalia
system" as the system of international relations that is "based on the exclusive
primacy of the nation-state").
11. Rome Statute, supranote 4, pmbl.
12. See id. at art. 1.
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I think this momentum can be traced to three main regions:
Europe, which experienced centuries of war and the crimes of the
Second World War and Balkan wars,1 and then Africa and South
America, which have also suffered many such crimes. 4 These are
the three regions that are leading and adopting this new concept.
I think that in the United States it is difficult to understand this
idea, because the United States has this idea: "We're powerful, we
protect ourselves with our army." But small countries protect
themselves with the law. And so for them it is a different concept.
I remember at the beginning of this year we were at a meeting
with some ambassadors of the Security Council and the Costa
Rican ambassador explained that some people were criticizing
Costa Rica, saying, "Oh, Costa Rica is naive, they were so active in
the Darfur case," and the Costa Rican ambassador took the floor
and said,
You have to understand, what we are doing is absolutely in
our national interest. Costa Rica has no army, so we use the
law to protect our land and our citizens. So for us to
strengthen the law is in our national interest. And we are
selfish, because we like to strengthen the law in Sudan, which
is remote, and not wait for a conflict in Costa Rica.
And the last point was great; he said, "And also, we have a
moral obligation, because there are twenty-six countries in the
world with no army, and Costa Rica is the biggest." So that is this
concept.

B. Appointment of a Prosecutor
This agreement was interesting because the United States
and the Clinton administration, particularly Madeleine Albright,
were pushing for this idea, but then a coalition of other countries
and NGOs pushed past the U.S. position. The biggest conflict was
about the prosecutor, because the United States was pushing for a
prosecutor, but one who was dependent on the Security Council to
13. See JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN, THE BALKAN WARS: 1912-1913 (1914), for
background on the Balkan Wars of the early twentieth-century. See also STEVEN L.
BURG & PAUL S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (1999).
14. See Salvador Herencia Carrasco, Implementation of War Crimes in Latin
America: An Assessment of the Impact of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 10 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 461 (2010) (explaining the challenge of
implementing the Rome Statute in Latin American countries that are plagued by a
history of war crimes and crimes against humanity); see also Lutz Oette, Peace and
Justice, or Neither? The Repercussions of the al-Bashir Case for International
CriminalJustice in Africa and Beyond, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 345 (2010) (providing
an overview of the obstacles to using the system of international criminal justice to
prosecute infamous war criminals of Africa).
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initiate cases. European, South American, and African leaders
said, "No, the Security Council will always make deals." So the
question of an independent prosecutor was a major part of the
debate over the agreement, and at the end, in a very shocking way,
the independence of the prosecutor prevailed. The next question
asked who would ratify the treaty. But one after another ratified,
and by July 1, 2002, more than sixty countries had ratified the
treaty. "

Next, the states started to look for judges and prosecutors to
implement the idea. In December, I got a phone call; they said,
"I'm calling you because your name is on the list to be a candidate
for the Prosecutor's Office, but we don't know if you're interested
in the job." I was a lawyer in those days in Argentina, and never
thought I would be appointed. I told my wife, "Don't worry, they
will never appoint me." But three months later, they called me,
and I was appointed. So a new life started for me. It's very
interesting. So I would like to give you some idea of what it means
to be prosecutor for, now, 114 states."
Before I became Prosecutor, I set up meetings with the
ambassadors of the countries that were parties to the agreement.
And in one of the meetings with the European ambassadors, the
French ambassador asked me: "Okay, Prosecutor, you are from
Argentina, a civil-law country, but you've spent a lot of time in the
U.S. So are you a common-law lawyer or a civil-law lawyer?" So I
took my copy of the Statute and I said, "Look, I am a lawyer, and
this is my law. I will apply the law. That is it." I thought it was a
perfect answer. Wrong. The ambassador jumped on me: "Oh, no!
You have to defend the civil law." So that is part of the problem.
My constituencies have consensus, but it is a tiny consensus, and
there are so many differences that to represent them is a really interesting activity. And in this sense, my background in Argentina
is really relevant for this, because in Argentina the law is not as
firm as it is in the United States, so it is important to explain and
shape the law. In my current position, it is also important to
explain as much as possible, to the Court's states parties, what I
am doing.
When I was appointed there were seventy-eight states parties," and today there are 114 states parties. With ratification
15. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 15 (granting the Prosecutor broad

authority to initiate and proceed with investigations).
16. See Ratification of the Rome Statute, supra note 6.
17. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 9.

18. See Press Release, United Nations, States Parties to Rome Statute Elect
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comes increasing acceptance of the idea that the treaty represents.
When I started, the Bush administration was hostile to the Court,
but that changed with the Darfur affair, when the Bush
administration adopted a strategy of "pragmatic engagement," in
which it supported the Court if it liked the case.20 But now the
United States likes almost all of the cases.
C. Goals of the Court
Another interesting effect of the Statute is the idea of
prevention. It is not about the number of prisoners; it is not about
the number of trials; it is about how people in these 114 states
adjust to the law. And in this sense, the Court is doing what
international law does-it confirms and establishes the extent of
the law. The beauty of this court is that one case in the Hague
impacts 114 states-a few cases in the Hague can have a global
impact. For me that is the main idea.
In February 2003, the judges were appointed: eighteen
judges appointed, no prosecutor. So for three months the judges
were saying, "Where is the prosecutor with the cases? We are
here, waiting." But I said at the time that the best outcome of this
Court would be zero cases, because that means either (1) there is
no genocide, or (2) in cases of genocide, national systems are handling the prosecutions. I have to respect national decisions to prosecute cases, because the Court is just a backup system.
The
judges were not very happy with my comments, saying, "Where
are the cases, Prosecutor?" I still think the best outcome is zero
cases, but when we have to do cases, we have to do cases. Let me
tell you where are we today, seven years later, in terms of trials.
Luis Moreno Ocampo as Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press
Release L/3035 (Apr. 22, 2003).
19. The States Partiesto the Rome Statute, supra note 9.
20. See Stephen Eliot Smith, Definitely Maybe: The Outlook for U.S. Relations
with the International Criminal Court Duringthe Obama Administration, 22 FLA.

J. INT'L L. 155, 161-65 (2010) (explaining that, though the Bush administration
initially took an "isolate and ignore" policy in regard to the Court, it relented
somewhat during President Bush's second term, most notably by refraining from
vetoing a proposal to refer the situation in Darfur to the Court); Arlene Getz, ICC
Prosecutor to Name 6 Next Week in Kenya Clashes, REUTERS AFR. (Dec. 9, 2010),

http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6B805W20101209?sp=true
(describing the Bush administration's policy toward the ICC as "pragmatic
engagement" in regard to the Court's involvement with Sudan).
21. First Election, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/

DE9BEA6B-EEC4-4B97-82E3-F5F922F9E5D5.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
22. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl. ("Emphasizing that the International
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions. . .").
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D. The Court's Work
We selected the following situations to investigate: Darfur,
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Kenya, and Central
African Republic (CAR).2 I think it is important to understand, in
the world today, the worst conflicts are here. That is why I have to
work here. Congo in particular is still suffering the Congo wars.
The Congo wars are the consequence of the Rwandan genocide,
committed by Hutus against Tutsis.' Then Paul Kagame, who
was the leader of a Tutsi rebel group [and later became president
of Rwanda], expelled the Hutus.2 More than one million Hutus
went to Congo and Tanzania, but in Congo the Hutu leaders of the
genocide were there, and they used the refugee camps to organize
themselves to attack Rwanda." Those attacks caused Rwanda
and Uganda, along with militia leader Laurent Kabila, to attack
Congo-then Zaire-resulting in the First Congo War. 7 In 1997
Laurent Kabila took Kinshasa and removed President Mobutu
Sese Seko." [About one year] after this coup, Laurent Kabila grew
tired of this Rwandan and Ugandan presence, and he made a
coalition including the Hutu militias [and hostilities between
Rwanda and Congo immediately resumed] .2 This Second Congo
War was between Kabila's coalition on one side, and Uganda and
Rwanda on the other." As a consequence of these wars, four
million people died, which is the greatest number of civilian
deaths since the Second World War." So my cases in Congo are
related to these wars.3 Who of you have heard of the Congo wars
before? Okay, so a very well-educated audience. In my country, if
I ask this question, they know more or less there was genocide in
23. Cases & Situations, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icenow.org/?mod=casessituations (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
24. HERBERT WEISS, NORDISKA AFRIKAINSTITUTET, CURRENT AFRICAN ISSUES
No. 22, WAR AND PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 2 (2000).
25. IDA SAWYER & ANNEKE VAN WOUDENBERG, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "YOU
WILL BE PUNISHED": ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN EASTERN CONGO 116 (2009).
26. Id.
27. WEISS, supra note 24, at 3-4.
28. Howard W. French, Mobutu Sese Seko, Zairian Ruler, Is Dead in Exile in
Morocco at 66, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1997, at Al.
29. WEISS, supra note 24, at 13-14.
30. Id. Kabila's coalition eventually included forces from Angola, Zimbabwe,
Namibia, Chad, and possibly Sudan. Id. at 14. Rwanda and Uganda were also
supported by anti-Kabila Congolese forces. Id. at 13-14.
31. INT'L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO:
AN ONGOING CRISIS 1 (2007).
32. See Democratic Republic of Congo, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=drc (last visited Feb. 5, 2011), for information on the
Court's cases arising from these conflicts.
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Rwanda, but they have no idea there were Congo wars. So it is the
neglected war.
In Sudan, Darfur is a consequence of the Khartoum policies.
Khartoum fought Southern Sudan for twenty years.' To understand Sudan, you have to understand Khartoum is like ancient
Rome; it's an empire, not a country, so when they have a rebellion
in the South they send the army to kill them.14 If there is a rebellion in Darfur, they send the army there-that is the way they
are working. If there is a rebel in a city, the city becomes the target and they just attack the people in the village. The CAR case is
also connected with the Congo conflict.35 The only outlier is
Kenya-our cases in Kenya relate to violence following a disputed
election."
In our first case, warrants were issued for [Congolese militia
leaders] Thomas Lubanga" and Bosco Ntaganda." They are
charged with crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under
the age of fifteen, and using them in hostilities." Conscripting
and enlisting are both different forms of recruitment, so we do not
care if the members of the family accepted the kid going into the
army, because there is no freedom there to decide, so in whatever
way the kids were included, it is a crime. Any kid under fifteen
working for these militias is a crime.4 o Our evidence shows the
impact on these kids who were going to school or playing football
and were abducted and turned into killers.4 ' You can see how this
training system brutalized them. For instance, they're forced to
discipline their friends. If they refuse, they receive 250 hits, or if
33. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "THERE IS No PROTECTION": INSECURITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN 2 (2009).
34. See Darfur, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/
?mod=darfur (last visited Feb. 5, 2011), for information on the Court's cases arising
from this conflict.
35. See Central African Republic, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=car (last visited Feb. 5, 2011), for information on the
Court's cases arising from the CAR.
36. Kenya, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icenow.org/?mod=
kenya (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
37. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Warrant of
Arrest (Feb. 10, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.intliccdocs/doc/docl9l959.PDF.
38. Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest
(Aug. 22, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc305330.PDF.
39. See Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 32.
40. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (defining as a "war crime" the
act of "[clonscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the
national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities").
4L See DRC: ICC's First Trial Focuses on Child Soldiers, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.hrw.orgen/news/2009/01/22/drc-icc-s-first-trialfocuses-child-soldiers.
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they lose a bullet, they receive 250 hits. If a girl refuses to be
raped, then one of the kids must kill the girl. So that is the way
they transform the kids into monsters.
Our charges emphasize the role of the girls because the girls
were used as killers, cooks, and sexual slaves all at the same time.
Because they were sexual slaves, they became the wives of the
commanders or the soldiers, so that later, when the United
Nations (U.N.) intervenes, they may ignore the girls, thinking that
as commanders' wives they are not also victims. So we emphasize
that the recruitment of girls is in itself a gender crime.
Prosecutions of such gender crimes are somewhat new. The Sierra
Leone tribunal prosecuted this type of crime based on customary
law," but this is the first time we have a treaty that describes the
crimes and defines the elements of the crimes." So this would be a
substantial decision.
Another legal issue is that the judge will determine if it is an
international conflict or a national conflict. The Ugandan army
was occupying the area, but we have no evidence that Uganda was
driving the decisions; they were supporting the militias in
different moments, different militias, but we have no information
that they were deciding the targets of the crimes. So we are
arguing that it is a national conflict but we let the judges decide,
and since we can be involved in national or international
situations, that decision will not make a big difference to us.
The final legal issue, which is very important, is the
punishment. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
created gradations for the severity of crimes, with genocide the
worst and war crimes less important." For us it is different. My
view is all these crimes are so serious that we request close to the
42. Binaifer Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-Conflict
Justice for Sierra Leone's Rape Victims, 18 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 88-90 (2005)

(discussing the efforts to address gender-related violence in Sierra Leone).
43. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(1)(h) (prohibiting persecution on the
basis of gender); art. 7(3) (defining "gender" as referring to "the two sexes, male and
female").
44. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), incorporatingU.N. SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security

Council Resolution 808 (1993), %%40, 44, 46, 49, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993),
availableat httpJ/www.icty.org/x/filefLegal%20Library/Statute/statute-re808_1993
..en.pdf (criminalizing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity); Statute for the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, annex arts. 2-4, U.N. Doc. SIRES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994) (criminalizing genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain violations of
the Geneva Conventions).
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maximum punishment for all of them. This can be an emotional
issue that will likely be discussed in the future.
II. The Trials
A. Lubanga Trial
Three months before the start of the Lubanga trial-the first
trial-the judges stayed the proceedings and ordered the release of
the prisoners because we did not disclose documents to the
defense." We were characterized as bad prosecutors, but I like the
fact that the Court took its role so seriously to enforce procedural
requirements. Of course, we have a duty to disclose to the defense
information that could be material for the defense.' In fact, we
had disclosed two hundred documents saying Uganda was
occupying the area where the crimes took place, and we had
another one hundred documents that were confidential that were
saying the same. So we informed the judges, "We have one
hundred documents that could be material for the defense." The
documents could have been material for the defense, because the
militia can say, "Uganda was there, they were the real organizers
of the crimes." So we told the judges that we had the documents
but that we could not disclose them to the judges or the defense,
because neither had a duty of confidentiality and could put sources
at risk. They said, "Thank you, but in this case we must stay the
proceedings." So this was a big issue, particularly for the victims
in Congo, because in that area, Lubanga is God. So we appealed
the stay, and the Appeals Chamber ruled that we had to disclose
our documents to the judges, but that the judges would have a
duty of confidentiality.
So we started the trial after summary motions, but then
there was a second motion in which two of the judges ruled that
they would like to add gender crimes to the charges in the middle
of the trial."' We said that was impossible, and the defense
agreed, but two judges were in favor of adding the charges, with
one judge against, so they ruled to add the charges, and we
appealed, slowing down the process for another four months. We
45. See Lubanga Case, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.orgf?mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
46. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision
on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article
54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused,
Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June
2008, 1 92 (June 13, 2008), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc511249.PDF.
47. See Lubanga Case, supra note 45.
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won the appeal, and the trial is moving forward."
Currently, there is a stay of the proceedings, but on a
different issue than before."' The defense is alleging abuse of
process by the prosecutor because we disclosed that one of our
intermediaries, who we used to get some witnesses, was lying. So
we told the defense that fact-that we believe the witnesses are
serious but the intermediary was lying. The defense took this
opportunity to present [a motion suggesting we were abusing court
process]," and requested information about all our intermediaries,
which jeopardized their lives. So we tried to fight with the judges,
"Please don't expose them to these people." The judges ordered
disclosure, but also protection-they ordered that we disclose
another three intermediaries, but after they were protected." The
defense complained, and the judges finally said, "Okay, we can
disclose, just a limited disclosure to Lubanga himself and one of
his close associates. Prosecutor, disclose in one hour." And we
said, "Look, Lubanga's a criminal, we believe he's a criminal, so we
would not like to disclose to him, and this person is number two at
the organization, so don't do it." So the judges were now thinking
we were just ignoring the ruling, and then they stayed the
proceeding, this time because the prosecutor was refusing to
comply with the Trial Chamber's orders." So they again ordered
disclosure to Lubanga, and we went to the Appeals Chamber and
we are waiting for the decision of the Appeals Chamber in a few
days. I think we will be okay. I think we are right. Because in a
way this is allowing us to discuss with the Appeals Chamber the
process of protection. Because the Trial Chamber believes they
have the final word and also the first word in protection. And we
are saying, "Yes, you have the final word, but you have to listen to
us because we know the situation on the ground; we are there. So
before you make any decision on protection, please let us present
our arguments." So that is the debate, and I think we will win."
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, 25 (May 31, 2010), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc881407.pdf.
51. Id. T 150.
52. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted
Decision on the Prosecutor's Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to
Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings
Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, 1f21 (July 8, 2010), http//www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc906l46.pdf.
53. Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo did win this appeal. See Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on Appeal of Prosecutor
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In any case, we disclose now after we know that our sources are
protected.
B. Katanga-NgudjoloChui Trial
The second case is against [Congolese warlords] Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui and Chairman Germain Katanga.54 They were the
leaders of the militias who were fighting with Lubanga's militias.
And in this case we charged them for the attack in Bogoro, a
village in the Congo, in the troubled region of Ituri." Basically,
they used child soldiers, they raped women, they killed more than
two hundred people, and they pillaged the entire community." In
this case there are two militias working together. So what we are
saying is they are co-perpetrators because they agreed to work
together." So we don't care who are the soldiers committing the
crimes because both commanders are responsible for both groups.
That is our allegation of liability.
C. Bemba Trial
The next trial which is coming in probably three or four
weeks is against Jean-Pierre Bemba." He is the son of the former
minister of the economy of DRC," so his father was the minister of
the economy of both Mobutu and Kabila. When Bemba saw the
chaos in Congo he used his money to build a militia, because that
is the way to get power in this area, you kill people and you get
power. In fact, he was appointed Vice President of Congo after the
end of the Congo wars.60
Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber I of 15 July 2010 to Release Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, 11 23-26 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www2.iec-cpi.intlicedocs/
doc/doc947862.pdf.
54. Katanga-Ngudjolo Chui Case, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT,

http://www.icenow.org/?mod=drctimelinekatanga (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
55. Id.
56. See id.

57. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01104-01/07, Prosecution's
Observations on the Joinder of the Cases Against Germain Katanga and Mathieu
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The first time my people went to the Congo to meet President
Kabila, I told them they also had to meet Bemba-at the time, the
government was fighting among itself. My advisor went to see
President Kabila's chief of cabinet, and he said to her, "Look,
working in Congo is very difficult; we are together, but we are
fighting each other, and six months ago we were killing each other,
and now we are together. It's so difficult to play together.
Imagine how we can be in the same government with Bemba. He
was eating pygmies in Ituri, he is a cannibal." Then, my advisor
asked me, "I have to meet this guy, the cannibal?" I responded,
"Yes. You have to go to see him, because we have to be fair." And
then she went to see Bemba. And Bemba said, "Oh, I'm very glad
you came here, because I was waiting for you. I have to explain to
you, it's so difficult for us to work here, because we were killing
each other and now we're working together." So the same speech.
And he said, "It's difficult, because they say stupid things. They
are saying I was eating pygmies in Ituri. Imagine. I can eat
pygmies in my own state. Why would I go to Ituri to eat pygmies?"
Great defense. But he was ready for us. He said, "I have this
folder with information for you; if you investigate me, I'm ready."
We pursued a different case against Bemba. There was a
coup d'etat in CAR, which borders Congo, and Ange-Felix Patass6,
the ousted president, called Bemba's militia to help him regain
power." Bemba had a special interest in CAR because in the past,
Kabila's forces reached Congo through CAR, so for him it was
important to control CAR. So Bemba went to CAR, and they raped
more than five hundred women and some men, and then pillaged.
Their actions demonstrated how rape can be a part of war, because
here, the soldiers were going house to house, looking for the chief
of the neighborhood. They particularly used rape against the
families of those who were perceived to have authority, to destroy
enemy leaders. For instance, in one of the cases we presented,
they were looking for the chief of the neighborhood, and when they
found the family, they first raped the daughters, then the wife,
and then they raped the man himself, in the public square.
Catharine MacKinnon6 is my gender advisor. I asked her, "Why
did they rape the man?" And she gave me a great explanation, she
told me, "Look, rape is the normal way to discriminate against
61. Patass4 was overthrown on March 15, 2003. Bureau of Afr. Affairs,
Background Note: Central African Republic, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Dec. 28, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4007.htm.
62. Catharine MacKinnon is the Elizabeth A. Long Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan Law School. Professor MacKinnon is also the founder of
Law and Inequality:A Journalof Theory and Practice.
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women, and in this case, they tried to treat this man as a woman.
They humiliated him, raping him in public." This man will be one
of the witnesses in the case. And in legal terms, this would be the
first case of command responsibility for rapes committed by the
troops.
D. Sudanese Rebel Leaders
The last case is a militia from Sudan.63 Bahar Idriss Abu
Garda was a leader and there are two others, Saleh Mohammed
Jerbo Jamus and Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, and we
issued a summons against them." The allegation in this case is
attacking peacekeepers." These men were part of the rebel groups
in Darfur, and in order to get weapons and cars, and also in order
to be recognized as powerful people who should be invited to the
peace process, they attacked peacekeeper operations and killed
twelve peacekeepers." One issue here is gravity-twelve is not so
many; normally our cases are hundreds or thousands of people
killed, or millions displaced, but we believe peacekeepers are
protecting millions of people, so protecting peacekeepers is very
important. Also, the case presents the issue of the status of
African Union and U.N. peacekeepers-are they protected or notbecause there were allegations that they were working for the
Sudanese government. The hearing for confirmation of charges in
that case is due in November.
This was the first case in which our challenge was how to
arrest individuals-those charged were in Darfur, and Sudan
would not let us in. Before this case we did other cases against the
government, including [against Sudanese President Omar] Al
Bashir," so we talked to all rebel groups and said, "Look, you
supported us on the Al Bashir case, but if we investigate you, you
have to say that you respect the Court." The five rebel groups
agreed. And I said, "Okay, now we are prosecuting you, so you
have to come to us." They agreed to come, so we needed to extract
them from Sudan. It was a big operation, because at the beginning we said, "Okay, we can go to you in U.N. helicopters from
Darfur to Juba, Sudan, and then from Juba by plane, but we

63. Darfur,supra note 34.
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. The alleged war crimes occurred against African Union peacekeepers at the
Haskanita military base in Darfur. Id.
67. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
68. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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needed U.N. approval." So I went to New York, talked to the U.N.,
and gave instructions. But the rebels didn't trust just any pilot, so
we had to find a pilot they trusted. Then the Sudanese government demanded the names of the passengers, which we would not
provide. So we had to look for a new idea. So in those days, we
were awaiting the decision of the Court in the Al Bashir case, and
George Clooney and Ann Curry, a journalist from NBC, were going
to Darfur with Nicholas Kristof. So we called the rebels and said,
"Look guys, we cannot extract you by air, but if you go the border
with Chad, I know you don't trust the government of Chad, but
George Clooney will be there, and he can assist you." And they
said, "Who is George Clooney? Okay, if you are there, if Europe is
there, we trust you, we'll do it." So we went there, but the group,
which is basically a mobile militia with fifty cars that move around
Darfur, was several days late in arriving. So George Clooney left,
but we convinced Ann Curry to stay. We had to convince the
French to give us a plane from N'Djamena, Chad to the ChadSudan border. So everything was settled. We were coming,
everyone was in the plane, and Ann Curry was filming the crew in
the plane. And the French commander said, "You cannot tape our
people, it's a covert operation. Give me the tape."
[Ann Curry responded,] "No. Freedom of the press."
"Give me the tape."
"Freedom of the press."
So the mission was aborted, back to N'Djamena. But the
rebels were coming in their fifty trucks, and they said we will
drive around for two days, but then you have to be there. So we
begged the French, "Please, no Ann Curry, just us." So we went
there, we received the guys. There were some other little
problems, but in the end they came out.
However, the judges were not deciding this case yet. So these
individuals tried to go to Libya, because Muammar Gaddafi was
supporting them. Gaddafi was supporting Al Bashir, supporting
the rebels, supporting me, supporting everyone. So, we stopped
them from going to Libya, then we agreed they could go to Kenya-basically no European countries would accept them, because
they were afraid that they would claim asylum, and also they were
criminals-so they went to Kenya and were put in jail. We begged
Kenya to release them; they were released and went back to Libya.
It's funny that Libya allowed these individuals to enter their
country-even Libya cooperates with us. So the individuals came
to the Court, we had a confirmation hearing, and interestingly the
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judges refused to confirm the charges against Abu Garda." And at
the end we did a similar thing with two other commanders, they
came to the Court also, and the confirmation judgment will be in
November 2010.0 So that's just a framework to see our legal
work, our complicated operations on the ground, and the different
dimensions of our work. Those are our trials and hearings.
III. Making Arrests
A. Uganda
The next challenge is to arrest individuals. Of these guys,
Lubanga was in jail, so Congo just transferred him to us; Katanga
was also in jail, transferred to us; and Ngudjolo was more difficult.
Ngudjolo was the head of intelligence of the Congolese army in
Ituri, so that was a problem, because when we were going to Ituri,
we could not release any information about our activities, because
we knew Ngudjolo would get that information. So Congo arrested
Ngudjolo, and Jean-Pierre Bemba was arrested in Belgium." It is
more complicated when these guys are surrounded by militias.
That is the case with both Ntaganda, who is managing a big
militia in the Kivu region of Congo, and Joseph Kony." I don't
know if you know Joseph Kony. For the last twenty-two years he
has abducted children in Northern Uganda, forcing them to kill
their parents, in order to destroy the relations of the village and
transform the children into killers. He would abduct girls from
the schools to give the most beautiful girls to the commanders as
rewards. He did not abduct a few girls, he abducted entire schools.
The intervention of the Court forced him to leave Sudan, which
was protecting him, and move to Congo. That move stopped his
activities in Uganda. When we started operations in Gulu, which
69. The charges hearing for Abu Garda occurred in October 2009. Darfur,
Sudan, ICC-02105-02/09, Case The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, INT'L
CRIMINAL
COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/

Situations/Situation+ICC+0205/Related+Cases/ICCO2050209.htm. On February 8,
2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm the charges against him, finding
that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegations that Abu Garda
participated in the attack on peacekeepers. Id.
70. The confirmation of charges hearing for Banda and Jerbo occurred on
December 8, 2010. Darfur,supra note 34.
71. Jean-Pierre Bemba was arrested June 10, 2008, and Mathieu Ngudjolo
Chui was arrested February 7, 2009. Veronica Glick, Timeline of the Status of
Cases Before the International Criminal Court, THE AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT (last updated Jan. 28, 2011),

http://www.amicc.org/docs/TimelineCasesICC.pdf.
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is a city in the north of Uganda, you had more than one thousand
kids who were walking each night to sleep in the center of Gulu.
Now it's different; the situation has improved a lot. The problem
is, the situation in Congo is worse, because Kony and others now
commit the same crimes there. So arresting Joseph Kony is
important. He is Lubanga's number two officer and the leader in
the Kivu region. I am currently investigating him and this group
that perpetrated genocide, who went from Rwanda to Congo. We
are working with Germany on this case, because the chairman of
this group of criminals is in Germany.
B. Darfur

The Darfur case is very important, because on the day of my
swearing in I remember talking to my advisor, the one who met
Bemba, about how we can get the Security Council to refer the
case to ICC, because that would be the easiest way to start the
case. And she said, "Forget it, in nine years, ten years, we have
not seen one Security Council referral." And that was true. I was
ignorant. However, two years later, the Security Council referred
the Darfur case." That shows how fast things are changing. In
our first case, it was a big challenge to investigate the case,
because I had to protect the witnesses, but I could not protect the
witnesses in Darfur, so we collected information from people who
were escaping from Darfur to different countries. So we identified
six hundred possible people from eighteen different countries. We
took testimony in eighteen different countries.
We presented the first case against Ahmad Harun." Ahmad
Harun was the Sudanese minister for humanitarian affairs.75 He
coordinated attacks against villagers. For me it was fascinating,
because in Argentina the crimes are committed by the state-it's a
military operation against civilians. The method in Sudan was to
organize at the local level, where they integrate police, army,
intelligence, tribal leaders, and political leaders, and they discuss
what to do in the city, because they know the city very well. Then
they report to the State Security Committee, and the State
Security Committee reports to one person, Ahmad Harun. When
Ahmad Harun went to Darfur the first time, the Fur ethnic group
leaders there met him and said, "We are very glad you came here,
73. Darfur, supra note 34.

74. See Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Al Abd
Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest (April 27, 2007),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.PDF.
75. Darfur, supra note 34.
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because we are under attack. You have to protect us." And he
immediately told them, "You are wrong. You are my enemies. I
will destroy you." Imagine you go to the police and say, "Yesterday
someone came to my house and raped my daughter, you have to
protect us," and the police say, "We did it, and tomorrow we will do
it again." What do you do? That is happening today in Darfur.
We presented this case, and after that President Omar Al Bashir
said he will not hand over Harun, because he was following
instructions." So we collected evidence against him, showing how
Al Bashir and Harun, after coordinating the attacks against the
villages and seeing the reaction of the international community,
organized a second phase of genocide, a more subtle genocide,
through rape, fear, and hunger, against the people in the refugee
camps. There are 2.5 million people living in refugee camps."
Women were raped, so often that now they are not even reporting
the rapes. They also used hunger and fear. Who coordinated
these attacks? The minister of humanitarian affairs. And who
was the minister of humanitarian affairs? Ahmad Harun, the
same person. And interestingly, where is Ahmad Harun today?
You know, today the big issue is Southern Sudan, in particular
Abyei, which is in Southern Sudan, where the oil is. Who is today
the governor of that area? Ahmad Harun. So if this Court was
created to prevent genocide, I hope people can understand that
Ahmad Harun in Southern Sudan is a very early warning that
genocide may be coming again to that area.
Conclusion
As I said before, the most important cases we are doing are
the cases we are not doing. For the ICTY the most important case
they did was the case they never did-the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) bombing.8 The threat to investigate created
a huge change in NATO. Today, if you are a colonel in the NATO
system, the first legal training you receive starts with this: the
legal advisor of NATO explains to you, "Colonels, listen to me,
76. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/0501/09, Case Information Sheet (July 12, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/08B26814-F2B1-4195-8076-B4D4026099EC/282348/bashirEngl.pdf
(stating that Al Bashir either authorized the role that Harun played in the crimes,
or was actually in full control of the crimes that occurred).
77. Alfred de Montesquiou, African Union Force Ineffective, Complain Refugees

in Darfur,WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2006, at A15.
78. See CoMM. ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR

(2000), http://www.icty.orglx/file/About/OTP/otp-.report-natobombing.en.pdf.
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because if not, what will happen is in twenty years, when you are
retired two-star generals, sitting on the beach, suddenly you are
surrounded by gendarmerie and they handcuff you and you go to
the Hague. And the evidence will be your orders, signed as part of
NATO." So it is really working.
This idea, what we are doing with the Court, is not just doing
cases. The cases are just part of the Rome Statute, just a phase of
the system. The strength of the system is the commitment of the
states that ratified the treaty to end impunity for the most serious
crimes. It is not just the states that are committed-probably
most of the citizens concerned are from the United States, which is
not a state party; individuals like yourselves are part of the
community that supports this idea. That is why I would like to
understand how we can work together to keep assuring that there
is no more impunity for these crimes. Thank you very much.

